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Millwood v. State: ANONYMOUS TIP 
PROVIDES REASONABLE 
SUSPICION NEEDED TO JUSTIFY 
AN INVESTIGATORY STOP 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland in Millwood v. State, 72 Md. 
App. 82, 527 A.2d 803 (1987) held that an 
anonymous tip provided a reasonable sus-
picion to justify an investigatory stop of 
Defendant's automobile. In so holding, the 
court of special appeals affirmed the circuit 
court ruling. 
On January 31, 1986 at 4:45 p.m., an 
anonymous caller informed a Maryland. 
State Police dispatcher that a purple "1965 
Ford Thunderbird with Pennsylvania 
license plates was traveling south on 
Interstate 81 on a drug run from Penn-
sylvania into Maryland." Millwood, 72 
Md. App. at 84, 527 A.2d at 804. The 
informant alleged that the automobile was 
carrying methamphetamines either in the 
trunk or taped inside the grill. Addition-
ally, he stated when the car would cross 
into Maryland and described its occupants. 
Id. at 85, 527 A.2d at 804. 
Soon after alerting its counterpart in 
Pennsylvania, the Maryland State Police 
were informed that such a vehicle was, in 
fact, traveling south. Maryland State 
troopers were sent out to set up surveil-
lance posts along Interstate 81 near the 
state border. 
The vehicle was spotted by one of the 
troopers at approximately 5:50 p.m. as it 
crossed into Maryland. Two state troopers 
followed the suspect vehicle hoping to 
observe the driver commit a traffic viola-
tion. Unfortunately for the officers, this 
did not happen. The officers were given no 
valid reason to stop the suspect vehicle, 
yet, they did. 
The troopers motioned for the driver to 
pull his car over to the side of the road 
after confirming that the car met the infor-
mant's description. Charles Millwood, the 
driver, pulled over, got out of the car, and 
then was ordered to "spread eagle" so that 
he could be frisked by the officer. The 
trooper informed Millwood that an anon-
ymous tip had been received with informa-
tion matching .the description of 
Millwood's car including its occupants and 
that a quantity of methamphetamines 
would be in the car. Id. at 86, 527 A.2d at 
805. 
The parties have differing stories as to 
what happened next, but as a result of the 
search a large quantity of metham-
phetamines and two handguns were dis-
covered. Millwood and his female 
passenger were then placed under arrest. 
At trial, the Defendant's motion to sup-
press the evidence obtained during the 
search was denied. The court reasoned that 
there was probable cause to search the car 
or alternatively that the Defendant con-
sented to the search. With this evidence, 
Millwood was convicted for possession of 
methamphetamines along with several 
other charges. 
On appeal, Millwood contended that the 
trial court erred in denying the motion to 
suppress the evidence. He asserted that the 
information given by the anonymous 
tipster was insufficient to constitute prob-
able cause to search. Furthermore, 
Millwood insisted that his consent to the 
search was not voluntary. Moreover, even 
if Millwood had consented to the search, 
that consent and the resulting search were 
"fruits of the poisoned tree" as products of 
an illegal stop. Id. at 87, 527 A.2d at 805 
(citing U70ng Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471 (1963». 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, however did not agree with 
Millwood's contentions. The court found 
that the investigatory stop was valid as 
well as Millwood's consent to search. 
In its reasoning, the court of special 
appeals used several Supreme Court deci-
sions. U nder Terry v. Ohio, a police officer 
may approach, accost, and temporarily 
detain a person for the purpose of 
investigating possible criminal activity 
without the probable cause needed for an 
actual arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,22 
(1968). An officer need only be reasonable 
in his conclusion that criminal activity is 
afoot. Terry describes this as a "reasonably 
articulable suspicion" that a crime is being 
or is about to be committed. Id. at 21-2. 
This suspicion can be a result of an infor-
mant's tip. See, e.g., Adams v. U7illiams, 407 
U.S. 143 (1972). . 
Courts are divided on the issue of 
whether an anonymous tip constitutes a 
reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court 
in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) 
adopted a "totality of the circumstances" 
test and held that an anonymous tip, 
which police were able to verify as to 
various details, furnished probable cause to 
issue an arrest warrant. Even though the 
informant's credibility was unknown, the 
police were able to verify details of the tip, 
thus giving credibility to the information 
and hence to the informant himself. 
Using this approach, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland examined the 
anonymous tip in Millwood. The descrip-
tion of the car, its occupants and its route 
may not have been enough to justify an 
investigatory stop. However, a reasonable 
suspicion was gained by the information 
regarding the approximate time the car 
would travel into Maryland. A casual 
observer or mischief maker predicting 
such information was highly unlikely. 
Regarding Millwood's contention that 
the search was invalid, the court of special 
appeals looked again to the Supreme 
Court for guidance as well as to Maryland 
holdings. 
The totality of the circumstances test 
was examined to determine whether 
Millwood's consent was valid. Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 312 U.S. 218, 229 (1973) 
states that "account must be taken of sub-
tly coercive police questions as well as the 
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the 
person who consents." 
The two versions of the events surround-
ing the search of the car were examined by 
the trial court. The appeals court accepted 
the trooper's story over Millwood's. The 
trooper stated that he told Millwood that 
he believed he had the right to search the 
car, but would like to have Millwood's 
permission. Millwood answered, "Go 
ahead, we have nothing to hide." With this 
consent, the trooper began the search and 
discovered the contraband. Millwood, 72 
Md. App. at 95,527 A.2d at 809. 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland accepted the trial court judg-
ment that voluntary consent was demon-
strated by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Id. at 96, 527 A.2d at 810. No 
police coercion was found. Millwood had 
relied on U7hitman v. State, 25 Md. App. 
428, 336 A.2d 515 (1975), where consent 
was given as a result of coercion. The court 
in that case identified eight occurrences to 
be of "enormous psychological effect and 
compelling circumstance." None were 
present in the instant case. 
Maryland appears to be following the 
trend of allowing an anonymous tip to 
provide the reasonable suspicion needed to 
justify an investigatory stop. 
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